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ABSTRACT
Tunisia’s reputation as the success story from the Arab Spring rests on the
integration of a stable democratic regime. Domestic as well as regional threats continue
to push the boundaries of this fledgling democracy. Development measures, and reform
of the Tunisian Internal Security Forces are paramount for the state’s survival. This work
presents measures for Security Sector Reform within Tunisia, then proceeds to create a
map a developmental intervention aimed at securing stability through several drivers.
Understanding that development is a security threat for Tunisia will help allies, other
regional actors, NGO’s, and other organizations furthers the unique situation where
Tunisia currently rests.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Located in the Maghreb, Tunisia is the northernmost country in the continent of
Africa. Its border to the west and south is Algeria and to the east and south is Libya and
the Mediterranean Sea sits north of Tunisia. Algeria’s strict border security has not
affected relations with Tunisia, and the two currently enjoy good relations. Gaddafi’s
downfall in 2011 has left Libya in turmoil and civil war strife. Loose border security
policies and the desert shared between Libya and Tunisia’s southwestern border creates
an open area for smuggling and trafficking of goods and humans. Tunisia focuses on its
internal affairs and security, preferring to stabilize its own people and state over meddling
in the affairs of its neighbors.
The Arab Spring movement of 2011 transformed the landscape of North Africa.
Tunisia, hailed as the success story of the movement, established a democratic regime
after ousting autocratic leader Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Police harassment and high
unemployment led Mohamed Bouazizi to perform self-immolation in December 2010.
Ben Ali proceeded to flee to Saudi Arabia in early January, then Tunisia began the
process of creating a democracy and free elections. In neighboring Libya, rebels backed
by the West and several Arab states toppled the Gaddafi regime after six months of
fighting.1
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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"Arab Uprising: Country by Country – Libya," BBC News, December 16, 2013.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-12482311.
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After promising a democratic state, Libya has been engulfed in militia and rebel
fighting, currently between pro-government forces, rebels, and various jihadist and
terrorist groups. Tunisia and Libya’s shared desert border became and continues to be
used as a transport spot for Islamic State (IS) fighters who wish to enter training camps
and IS strongholds. Lacking border controls continue to pose problems for both Tunisian
and Libyan forces.2 Ineffective security measures from Tunisia’s Internal Security Forces
(ISF) have allowed for jihadists and terrorists to move freely between Libya and Tunisia,
further destabilizing Libya and beginning to seriously affect the Tunisian government.

1.1 Why Tunisia?
As we are now five years into the Arab Spring, we ask why Tunisia? Egypt, Syria,
Iraq, Libya, and Yemen are engulfed in conflict, yet Tunisia is continuously praised as
the success in the region. The Tunisian state was chosen for this study because of its
stability in a region strife with conflict. Islamist party Ennhada’s voluntary step-down
from power because of fear among the civilian population demonstrates a maturity not
normally seen in the region.
However, many reasons exist to state why Tunisia should not be in this position.
The largest number of Islamic State fighters hail from Tunisia, it is a former autocracy,
the military is exceptionally strong, and the state is Arab-dominated. Several factors
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Jasmine Opperman. "Video: Chaos Anger And Frustration At Libya's Key Border Crossing With
Tunisia," Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium,. August 3, 2014.
http://www.trackingterrorism.org/chatter/video-chaos-anger-and-frustration-libyas-key-border-crossingtunisia.
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dissuade the state from falling into upheaval. Though Tunisia exports the highest number
of IS fighters, the population at large does not support extremist and jihadist activities. As
an Arab-dominated state, the disapproval and fear from the Ennhada-led Islamist party
and the party’s subsequent step-down from power demonstrates maturity. Second, the
military, while strong, refused to help Ben Ali in suppressing the demonstrates against his
regime. Leaders in the military understand their role is apolitical. The group does not
wish to interfere in domestic and political affairs, and believe the ISF and its National
Guard should control internal affairs.
History and the implementation of a secular government over religious
domination also paves the path for a stable democracy. Even before autocracy was
demolished, for example, the rights of women and education evolved greatly. Women
held the right to vote early on in Tunisia’s statehood, and the high levels of education
across primary, secondary, and tertiary levels complement the state’s development. Even
though high unemployment currently plagues the democracy and was a large reason for
Ben Ali’s ousting, the secular government and its establishment as such paves the road
for stability.
Further, the upgrade in ally status of Tunisia from the United States means
Western nations speculate a strong future for the state within Middle East North Africa
(MENA). As of 10 July 2015 President Barack Obama noted intent to designate Tunisia
as a Major Non-NATO ally (MNNA).3 This change in ally status shows the United States
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Office of the Spokesperson, "Designation of Tunisia as a Major Non-NATO Ally," U.S. Department of
State, July 10, 2015, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/07/244811.htm.
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appreciation in Tunisia’s decision to “join the world’s democracies” and appropriates the
necessity of increasing Western allies in MENA.
Development, especially in this case, is a security matter. Creating a strong
economic base will provide the framework for a lasting democratic regime. The work in
this paper uses PPP of GDP for its data instead of overall GDP. While PPP is not accurate
for each region within Tunisia, it is the strongest indicator to demonstrate how the
creation of an economic base for strength and stability will lead to higher security.
Incidents of terrorism were few and far between during the autocratic regimes that
ruled Tunisia before the Jasmine Revolution. Data from the Global Terrorism Database
(GTB) finds that from the first year the database began (1970) until the end of calendar
year 2010 there were eighteen incidents of terrorism.4 From January 2011 until the end of
calendar year 2014 GTD recorded fifty-six incidents of terrorism within Tunisia. The
sharp increase in terrorist incidents matches perfectly with the end of the Bel Ali regime
and the implementation of democracy. The implementation of civil liberties that come
with democracy were new to not only the citizens, who relished the newfound freedom,
but also to the government’s security apparatus’, which did not have an updated code of
conduct of mission statement since the Ben Ali regime fell. The slow start to reforming
the security sectors influenced the security situation in Tunisia into where it lies today.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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These data include two criterions for an incident to count as a terrorist activity; first, the act must be
aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal; second, there must be evidence of an
intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the
immediate events. An attack is defined as includes assassinations, armed assaults, bombings/explosions,
hijacking, hostage taking (barricade incident), hostage taking (kidnapping), facility/infrastructure attack,
unarmed assault, and unknown. The aggregation of incidents includes both unsuccessful and ambiguous
attacks within Tunisia’s borders.
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1.2 Background Literature
Several studies provide necessary background and framework for the completion
of this work. The first work cited is David D. Laitin and Jacob N. Shapiro’s “The
Political, Economic, and Organizational Sources of Terrorism.” Working to prevent
terrorism in Tunisia before it becomes a highly significant expenditure of government
spending needs organizational policy measures to succeed. It should be noted that once a
group takes terrorist tactics over more conventional measures to promote change, the act
of terrorism becomes self-perpetuating.5 Fighting terrorism itself moves funds away from
investment spending and into government spending.6 Tunisia’s clouded Internal Security
Force exists as a mystery to all except those who run it. Instead of increasing spending to
the organization without transparency and a history of corruption, the ISF must take
reform to develop its transparency and efficiency.
Laitin and Shapiro further state that terror and counterterrorism’s use “should be
considered a development issue.”7 Security of a state, both internally and externally, is a
development issue. This paper deals solely with Tunisia’s internal security situation and
recommended reforms. The cleavage between the ISF and the government, both of the
legislative Assembly of the Representatives of the People (ARP) and President’s office,
allows for increasing levels of jihadist and terrorist activity. Jihadist and terrorist groups
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Laitin, David D., and Jacob N. Shapiro. “The Political, Economic, and Organizational Sources of
Terrorism,” in Terrorism, Economic Development, and Political Openness, Edited by Philip Keefer and
Norman Loayza, 209. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
6

Ibid, 210.

7

Ibid.
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have higher effectiveness in democracies where the law makes it easier for groups to
survive and grow.8 Without significant changes in the ISF and its relations with the
government, Tunisia cannot hope to establish a stable and secure environment to both
expel and prevent jihadist and terrorist activity from rising and the overall state
succumbing to the chaos in the surrounding region.
S. Brock Bloomberg and Gregory D. Hess’s work demonstrates two important
principles. First, it shows that “higher income is negatively related to terrorism in poor
countries.”9 Second, the analysis demonstrates the need for the creation and
implementation of policies that encourage income growth.10 The importance of their
work lies in the necessity to develop Tunisia into a less corrupt and more transparent
state. This paper uses the Pardee Center for International Futures program to demonstrate
how increasing development indicators through intervention can increase income, among
other factors, and decrease corruption in the government. Encouraging income growth
promotes stability in a state because citizens become more engaged in the economy and
vie for its continued success and stability.
Peter Chalk and Kim Cragin of RAND found that social and economic
development has the ability to inhibit a resurgence of terrorism.11 The authors conducted
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Ibid, 211.

9

S. Brock Bloomberg and Gregory D. Hess. “The Temporal Links Between Conflict and Economic
Activity,” in Terrorism, Economic Development, and Political Openness, Edited by Philip Keefer and
Norman Loayza, 107. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
10

Ibid, 108.
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Peter Chalk and Kim Cragin, Terrorism & Development Using Social and Economic Development to
Inhibit a Resurgence of Terrorism, RAND, 2003.
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their study and procured six major findings. First, social and economic development
policies can weaken local support for terrorist activities. Second, social and economic
development can discourage terrorist recruits. Third, inadequately funded social and
economic policies are likely to inflate expectations and renew support for terrorism.
Fourth, the ability of development policies to inhibit terrorism depends on their
implementation. Fifth, social and economic development policies can be used as a stick
to discourage terrorism. And finally, social and economic development policies do not
eliminate terrorism. This final point is extremely important: It is not the goal of this work
to create a plan to eliminate terrorism. Instead, this work seeks to further stabilize the
Tunisian government to create a flourishing democracy in the region.
Seung-What Choi’s 2015 work conducts an economic study finding that
“economic growth is not a cure-all solution for terrorism…[and] healthy economic
conditions are, without doubt, beneficial to the war on terrorism because the majority of
suicide attacks occur in only a few countries.”12 This work holds new findings through
the conduction of Choi’s work. Economic growth is divided between agriculture and
industrial instead of using economic growth as a single indicator. Choi sees that higher
industrial economic growth is associated with decreasing and lower levels of
international and domestic terrorist threats. However, higher levels of industrial growth
associate’s itself with increased suicide attacks. Again, Choi’s work does not state that
economic development is a cure for terrorism. Instead, he finds that social cleavages

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Seung-What Choi, “Economic growth and terrorism: domestic, international, and suicide,” Oxford
Economic Papers, 2015.
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between the rich and poor does not necessarily associate with increased terrorist activity.
Although Choi does not see increased economic development as a one-cure solution for
terrorism, he does see a healthy economy as beneficial to fighting terrorism because “the
majority of suicide attacks occur in only a few countries.”13 This study takes social and
political reform coupled with economic development indicators in order to create a wellrounded policy to increase Tunisia’s democratic stability and ability to drive back
increased terrorist activity on its eastern borders in Libya. Aaron Gold and Sambuddah
Ghatak find that highly developed countries are less likely to have terrorist attacks than
those who are lesser developed.14 Working with literature from the Pardee Center as well
as studies conducted from think tanks, governments, and private corporations provide
strong literature for analysis.
This work creates two intervention scenarios spanning across development
indicators in order to establish the stability needed for democracy to flourish. The
International Futures program from the Pardee Center for International Futures at the
University of Denver is used for this study. Drivers are used to create scenarios from
which forecasted changes are measured against the Base Case of current data. Drivers for
this study are the rate of tertiary graduation, the level of economic freedom, and the level
of multi-factor productivity. Variables for this study, including definitions and
assumptions, are as follows:

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Choi, 5.

14

Aaron Gold and Sambuddah Ghatak, “Development, discrimination and domestic terrorism: Looking
beyond a linear relationship,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2015.
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I.!

Freedom History Plus Forecast: Derived from Freedom House
measures. The Freedom in the World survey contains reports on
192 countries and 15 related and disputed territories. Each country
report begins with a section containing basic political, economic,
and social data arranged in the following categories: polity,
economy, population, purchasing power parities (PPP), life
expectancy, religious groups, ethnic groups, capital, political
rights, civil liberties, and status (free, partly free, or not free).
Freedom House has been publishing annual yearbook since 1978.15

II.!

Democracy Level, Polity (Negative 10 to 10): The Polity
conceptual scheme is unique in that it examines concomitant
qualities of democratic and autocratic authority in governing
institutions, rather than discreet and mutually exclusive forms of
governance. This perspective envisions a spectrum of governing
authority that spans from fully institutionalized autocracies through
mixed, or incoherent, authority regimes (termed "anocracies") to
fully institutionalized democracies. The "Polity Score" captures
this regime authority spectrum on a 21-pont scale ranging from -10
(hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). The
Polity scores can also be converted into regime categories in a

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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“The Database of International Futures,” Pardee Center for International Futures,
http://www.ifs.du.edu/assets/documents/theifsdatabase5_09.pdf.
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suggested three part categorization of "autocracies" (-10 to -6),
"anocracies" (-5 to +5 and three special values: -66, -77 and -88),
and "democracies" (+6 to +10).16#
III.!

Governance Corruption (TI) Higher Score Means Less Corrupt:
Corruption is a function of past corruption level, GDP per capita
(inverse), energy trade dependence, democracy (inverse), gender
empowerment (inverse), and probability of intrastate conflict.17

IV.!

Economic Freedom: The Fraser Institute is an independent nonpartisan research and educational organization based in Canada. Its
annual Economic Freedom of the World report, uses 42 distinct
pieces of data to measure economic freedom in 141 nations from
1970 to 2007.18

Tunisia’s security and future as the success story of the Arab Spring depends on
establishing a new internal security policy. Before any intervention to increase income,
productivity, or economic freedom can be implemented, the government needs to reform
the ISF not only to work with the government but also to gain favor from its citizens. The
divide between the public and the government threatens the efficacy of the Tunisian
government and the status of the state as a whole. Reform of the ISF to introduce
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16

“The Polity Project,” Center for Systematic Peace, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html.

17

Pardee Center for International Futures.

18

Ibid.
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transparency and accountability measures as an object not fully independent of the
government, as it exists now, is the primary need to establish security. After the ISF
reforms enact, the state can then begin fighting corruption in its own bureaucracy to
ameliorate its relationship with the public and work against the jihadist and terrorist
threat facing Tunisia. Internal security, and to a greater effect the fight against terrorism,
is a development concern. Without organizational policies that create a transparent
security force and enforcement mechanisms, Tunisia will fall to the threat of terrorism.
This work outlines the reform measures the government must make with the ISF,
including difficulties that remain even after Ben Ali’s ousting, in order to create a base of
security, and follows with an intervention scenario that promotes long-term stability
through decreasing corruption, increased income and education, and higher multi-factor
productivity.

!
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CHAPTER TWO: PRIMARY REFORM NEEDS FOR SECURITY
Dissident among the Internal Security Force and the military plays a large role in
preventing Tunisia’s growth. The role of the police during the Jasmine Revolution, who
had the most to lose with Ben Ali’s ousting, has left the force resented by the public and
military. Struggles from the authorities to deal with rising jihadist activity demonstrates
the necessity of reform for the ISF. Resistance from the ISF on reforms has resulted in a
stall between the Assembly of the People’s Representatives (ARP) internal forces.
Several reforms must be made to prevent a further rise in jihadism and preserve Tunisia’s
new government. First, tensions between the ISF and the military, as well as citizens,
must be smoothed. Working to hold those accountable for human rights abuses and
removing the immunity of ISF members is the most important reform, and thus has been
met with the highest resistance. Second, the lack of transparency in the ISF and
overlapping duties between departments alludes to the Ben Ali regime and the ability of
the ISF to maneuver and take actions with little to no responsibility. As seen through the
internal development reforms in this paper, corruption and a lack of transparency hinders
development of an effective government. The ineffectiveness of the security sector
directly contributes to the rise in jihadism and terrorist attacks throughout the state – not
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only attacks on borders but also within the capital and inland.19 Moving out of the ISF
doctrine of Politics of Fear and into an era of transparency and trust between the citizens
and security forces is a precursor for the continuance of this government.
Security, according to Tunisia’s citizens, is considered the single-greatest problem
facing the state.20 The culture of impunity surrounding Tunisia’s police force continues to
impose problems and further the divide with civil society. Police unions were
immediately established after the fall of Ben Ali.21 These unions argue for high
socioeconomic status and legislation protecting their jobs. Passing this legislation can be
seen as a continuation of the privileges enjoyed under the Ben Ali regime. In order for
any sort of Security Sector Reform (SSR) to come about, both the ISF and the APR must
understand that direct confrontation will not yield successful results. Reform of the
security sector does not mean better or more high-equipped counter-terrorism units:
Rather, reforming the structure, purpose, and transparency of the security sector serves to
strengthen the state overall. The rapidly-deteriorating regional situation signifies that SSR
needs to happen now – further lack of a concrete plan from the government and the ISF
will only leave Tunisia vulnerable to further crises.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19

Ömer Taşpınar. "The Problem with Radicalism," The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, Fall 2015,
Accessed February 09, 2016. http://thecairoreview.com/essays/the-problem-with-radicalism/.
20

"Survey of Tunisian Public Opinion, June 22 - July 1, 2014," International Republican Institute, February
2014. http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2014 August 19 Survey of Tunisian Public Opinion, June 22July 1, 2014_0.pdf.
21

Bassem Bouguerra. "Reforming Tunisia's Troubled Security Sector," Atlantic Council, October
2014. http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Reforming_Tunisias_Troubled_Security_Sector.
pdf
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2.1 Reforms from Legislative Body
The role of the political class, as the legislative body, will be to overhaul the
current standards in conjunction with the ISF. This will prevent the public’s fear of the
police and also show the commitment to the democratic regime. Many security
apparatus’ have not changed operationally since Ben Ali remained in power. Class divide
between citizens of the interior and the ISF has damaged the reputation of the group, and
increased terrorist attacks serves to further isolate the ISF. Strong opinion of the army,
who refused to follow Ben Ali during the Jasmine Revolution, has led to calls for it to
take on a greater role in protecting domestic security. The increasingly fragile state of
security in Tunisia has led some to question what the government plans to do regarding
public policy towards security, as nothing concrete has formed. The following reforms
highlight what the state needs to do in order to create the base-layer of security needed to
increase Tunisia’s development in an ever-deteriorating region.

I. The government must not decrease the use of the ISF by placing responsibilities
in the hands of the army. Placing the national army in control of aspects like
border control and traffic police duties may increase security in the short-term,
but it would not provide long-term stability. Adding too much power to the
military will increase fears from citizens and politicians alike that the branch
could gain enough momentum to stage a coup.22 The role of the ISF is important
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22

"Reform and Security Strategy in Tunisia," International Crisis Group.,July 23, 2015.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle East North Africa/North Africa/Tunisia/161-reform-andsecurity-strategy-in-tunisia.pdf, 24.
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and vital for Tunisia’s survival – decreasing its power would demonstrate a lack
of faith in a government whose sweeping reform in regime change garnered a
Nobel Peace prize. Merely sidestepping the problems in the ISF would not
contribute to solving the lack of transparency and corruption that truly underlies
the lack of security facing Tunisia. Severing an integral role of the ISF not only
would demonstrate a lack of want to reform, but also a lack in communication
between the government and the group.

II. The ARP and the ISF must meet and jointly create a reform for the ISF that
maintains the independence of the latter while increasing transparency and
decreasing arbitrary management. Previous attempts at reform independent of
ISF contribution have led nowhere.23 In order to create an effective SSR, the ARP
and ISF must undertake several steps for the code’s creation. First, the ISF should
undertake internal evaluations of its employees from all levels in order to
understand what an ISF worker believes is his/her profession in the post-Ben Ali
era. Though there have not been changes legislatively, there has been a change in
opinion of duties with the new government and the want to bridge the gap
between police and military and police and citizen relations.

Second, the creation of a committee jointly run by members of the ISF and the
ARP in order to find the common ground and increase transparency within the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23
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ISF.24 This committee will draft a new code of conduct for the ISF, along with
proper management and disciplinary rules and regulations. The goal of the code
of conduct is to create competent and high-quality levels of security services
within Tunisia. This code will provide the legal revision that citizens and the
political class has called for since the government’s establishment. Creating a
clear mission for the ISF, specific job duties for each position, and a hierarchical
structure that prevents the extreme overlap currently present as well as increase
transparency within the ISF are mandatory to establish a successful SSR. A
national security directive must also be established so that the ARP can publicly
announce a plan of action to decrease jihadism and terrorist activity throughout
the state.

III. Increase communication between the Executive Branch, the ARP, and the ISF
to ensure transparency and maintain a clear plan of action for Tunisia’s security.
The independence of each branch of government and of the ISF works to maintain
the democratic structure of this government. Communication among the three,
whose common goal is to maintain Tunisia’s security, should occur at least biannually in times of peace and increase during times of conflict or crisis. Each
governmental organ’s understanding of the roles, actions taken, and actions
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24

Though others, such as the Crisis Group report in the previous footnote, wish to state the ISF should
reform itself, it is necessary that there be some commonality between the ARP and the ISF. A collaboration
between the two organs will not only increase government efficiency, but also help integrate the ISF into
the government in such as way that it no longer exists as an organ shrouded in secrecy and no transparency.
Though the ISF should maintain much of its independence status and not be completely controlled by the
government, collaboration is key to create the stable base needed for security development.
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planned in maintaining security takes high precedence to create the baseline of
security that Tunisia needs in order to move forward in its development.

IV. Ameliorate the relationship between the ISF and the public through increased
transparency. Establish multiple public forums throughout the country in order to
reach those living in the interior and borders. Different problems and tensions
between the ISF and public exist depending on regional location.25 The purpose of
these forums is to discredit assumptions about the ISF and state the goals of the
ISF’s various security institutions in order to dispel the shroud of confusion
among Tunisia’s citizens. These forums should also outline the threats facing the
ISF, including jihadism and terrorism as well as other illegal activity that occurs
within state borders, in order for the public to better understand why the ISF has
various departments and their roles in promoting security. Mending the
relationship between the ISF and the public will also help relieve some tensions
between the police and the military. Standing at different poles during the Jasmine
Revolution, the relationship between the two will mend when transparent goals
are established, proclaimed, and the military sees the police and the ISF as a
whole working to establish itself as a viable and trustworthy organization.

V. Use the international community to help establish resource management and
budget transparency instead of just equipping security forces and anti-terrorism
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25
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units. International efforts, stemming from Western Europe and the United States,
primarily root themselves in equipping security forces.26,27 While arming ISF to
perform its job is vital to success, the lack of transparency towards budgets and
little to no resource management continues to plague the organization. These
states wish to increase the effectiveness of the ISF, but without proper planning,
training, and measures to increase transparency jihadist and terrorist attacks will
continue their increase. Improving democratic governance and transparency are
not currently goals of these programs. Creation of a comprehensive engagement
program that trains the ISF, increases budget transparency, and continues to help
arm forces is better suited than current programs.

The implementation of these reforms is the primary step to establish security in
Tunisia. Baseline establishment of security must be met before any further reforms to
increase security and the strength of the government. The role of the ISF is vital to
Tunisia’s success as a democratic regime. SSR needs to revolve around the ISF’s lack of
transparency and tensions it holds with the military and the public. Increased jihadist and
terrorist activity and threats throughout Tunisia and the surrounding region placate the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26

"Décret N°2014-987 Du 27 Janvier 2014 Portant Ratification D'un Protocole D'accord Entre Le
Gouvernement De La République Tunisienne Et Le Gouvernement Du Royaume D'Espagne Pour La Mise
En œuvre Du Projet « Renforcement Des Capacités Des Agents Des Prisons." La Législation Du Secteur
De La Sécurité En Tunisie: Accès Aux Lois, Décrets Et Autres Textes Juridiques Consolidés Et Mis À
Jour. January 27, 2014. Accessed February 09, 2016. http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/33514.
27

"Model Police Stations Launched in Tunisia." UNDP. June 5, 2014. Accessed February 09, 2016.
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2014/06/05/model-police-stationslaunched-in-tunisia/.
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necessity for immediate SSR. Reform will only come through communication,
compromise, and relieved tensions between the ISF and the rest of the country.
The importance of this work lies in reforming Tunisia’s ISF to provide further
transparency decreasing corruption through quantifiable measures. However, it is
important to know that everything is not quantifiable. Understanding that seemingly
random, catastrophic events can quickly and drastically change the course of a state
cannot be understated. Due to these events’ unpredictability this work does not take their
occurrence into account, although the imperative aspect is to understand that statechanging events can, have, and do occur seemingly with no indication.
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CHAPTER THREE: DEVELOPMENT INTERVENTION
Following the events of January 2011, Tunisia overthrew its autocratic regime
leader Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali to establish a democracy. Many drivers pushed this
movement; among them are high levels of unemployment, a highly educated and
plentiful youth population, and a government that only responded to the political and
economic elite.28 As of September 2015 a permanent democracy has been established,
ruled by the moderate Nidaa Tounis party. However, security within the state enters a
state of crisis as increased terrorist activity and conflict in neighboring Libya overflows
into Tunisia.
This section will provide background information, history, and the context of
what drivers work to forecast the security situation inside of the state. The background
information will include population and education demographic trends in the years
leading up to and through the Jasmine Revolution. Another interesting driver this work
will investigate is the presence of democracy. Democratic trends will be extremely new
because of the autocracy’s overthrow in 2011, but the indicators of democracy over time
will demonstrate how the state moves during autocracy, during the regime change, and
the establishment of a democratic regime and its principles. Following the presentation to
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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answer the question, “Where are we now and why,” what can be expected in the future
and a discussion of this model’s drivers that influence this scenario.
The models and scenarios created for this study will use the International Futures
model located at the University of Denver’s Pardee Center for International Futures.
Because International Futures relies on aggregated data and conditions from reliable and
trustworthy sources, the forecasted future projections and changes in variables create
plausible forecast trends that can be used in comparison. Use of these models in this
paper will cover the demographics used in this study in their current state and run
scenarios of where they can expect to move.

3.1 Background & Conceptual Framework
One of the newest goals of the Tunisian government is to decrease the high level
of unemployment plaguing its population. Unemployment in the final years of the Ben
Ali regime climbed steadily (12.44% to 13.05%) then jumped after the regime fell to
18.90%. Though the unemployment level decreased from the establishment of a
democratic regime (down 11.47% to 16.72% in 2012, to 15.33% in 2013, to 15.3% in
2014), the decreases are slowing to an incredibly high rate bringing uncertainty into the
future of the economy. Youth unemployment (defined as unemployment of those aged
15-25) has risen from 2010 levels, climbing from 28.30% to 31.20%. In the youth
unemployment data, males are more likely to be unemployed than women, creating a
ratio of 32.00% unemployment for youth men and 29.30% unemployment for youth
women.
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Several drivers exist behind Tunisia’s current levels of corruption. This
deliverable focuses most heavily on the corruption in the educational system that feeds
into corruption within the bureaucracy. Also, high levels of inequality among an educated
populous drives levels of corruption and decreases GDP per Capita. Further, economic
freedom levels are rising but the overall corruption levels of the bureaucracy mean
citizens are wary of their government, creating a rift in the relationship between
population and government. The gap between the citizens and the government is one of
the reasons Tunisia is not developing as quickly as possible. However, working to mend
the gap between the two while also working to combat corruption from the base levels
will create a new generation that will enter the workforce without having lived through a
corrupt education system. Because many students attend university in order to obtain the
prerequisite for a government job, those who attend and matriculate through tertiary
education will be those who not only attended university with the skills to complete
education but also wish to learn. Further, decreasing corruption and melding the
relationship between citizens and the government will create an environment that fosters
economic freedom vitality throughout the economy. The chart below demonstrates how
and where corruption exists and and how the circle between education and bureaucracy
feeds its continuation.29

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Data and work on the drivers of corruption can be found in Kate Lapham’s “Cleaning up Tunisian
Education (16 July 2013), Dor Srebernik’s “Inequality and Corruption: Drivers of Tunisia’s Revolution”
(2014), and Mihaylo Milovanovitch’s “Trust and Institutional Corruption: The Case of Education in
Tunisia (22 May 2014).
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Figure One. Drivers of Corruption
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Figure Two. Population Distribution for Tunisia in year 2010. Created with International Futures V 7.15.
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3.2 Population
Tunisia’s population is 10.55 million people (2010) growing at a rate of 0.92%
annually. Sixty-six point three percent of the total population lives in urban areas and
urbanization is growing at an annual rate of +1.34%. As the chart below demonstrates,
there is a strong youth bulge among the working age population, and the next generation
appears to also be high in youth as well, although not to the youth bulge level facing the
state today.
The distribution of the populations among males and females are also generally
equal, although the next generation does hold a higher population of males30 in relation to
females. The
extreme youth
bulge visible
shows that the
age groups with
the majority of
the population
are those in the
working age. The
female population tends to

Figure Three. Youth Bulge, Percent of Adult Population Between 15
and 29. Created with International Futures Program.

live longer than their counterpart, although this demonstrates a difference in lifestyles and
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Although it is common the in the 0-4 age range there are more males born than females. More boys/men
die than their female cohorts, so this statistics should not raise concerns.
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health habits between the two genders. The groups of 20-29 are the most distressed group
in the Tunisian population. High levels of secondary- and tertiary-level education and the
lack of available employment opportunities were two of the driving factors behind the
establishment of democratic rule. If the population continues to grow at its current
estimated rate of 0.92% per annum, then the government will have to increase its ability
to contain unemployment to lower levels than it has seen in the past. This style of
population growth, if continued, also dictates a forecasted sharp drop in the youth bulge
where it eventually levels off in 2025-2035 and then falls even lower into 2050.

3.3 Education
The enseignement de base (primary education) is compulsory and divided into six
years of primary and three years of preparatory, also known as lower secondary. Students
are tested in both Arabic and French with a higher emphasis on Arabic reading, writing,
and comprehension due to the Arabization phase in the region31 after independence.
Primary education levels during the Ben Ali regime in 1997-2011 fluctuated but stayed
above 94%, growing quickly with the new millennium and dropping again five years
later. There was a quick jump in primary education enrollment levels in 2009, but these
quickly fell again and have continued to fall since. Even though the education rate levels
have dropped sharply since 2009, enrollment has not dropped below 94.5% since before
2000. Further, the establishment of a permanent parliament and government constitutes

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Arabization occurred shortly after states in the Maghreb gained independence from France. This
movement involved removing French language from the culture entirely (street names, used as compulsory
language in education) and renaming/restructuring society towards embracing Arabic as a homage to
traditional culture in the pre-colonial era.
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one of the driving factors that primary education enrollment will increase and continue to
do so until almost one hundred percent of eligible students are enrolled.

Figure Four. Education Enrollment of Primary Students Net Percentage, History and Forecast. Made with
International Futures.

Enseignement secondaire (secondary education) is open to all who successfully
finish primary and lower secondary. After one year of secondary, students choose one of
five specializations, where instruction in technical, scientific, and mathematical fields is
taught in French, while the other specializations (language arts, economics, and
management) are taught in Arabic. After the fourth year, students sit the Examen
National du Baccalauréat, where, if passed, students are guaranteed place at a university.
While data is not available from before 2000, more than sixty percent of eligible students
!
!

26

were enrolled in secondary education. Since 2010 the number has only grown, forecasted
to keep increasing as time continues. Predictions state that the higher enrollment and
education levels will lead to a higher sophistication within the economy and a more
technical work force.

Figure Five. Secondary Education Net Enrollment Rate, History and Forecast. Created with International Futures.

Tertiary education is centrally controlled through the système national
d’orientation universitaire which uses an algorithm to meet the ministry-set quota for
each field of study and university. It is not popular among students because it does not
mean that they always get to choose their choices. Grading scales are similar to France,
where students must achieve at least a ten out of twenty in order to pass a course.
University education has an unusually high rate of drop outs – 45% of all students who
27
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begin a program at a Tunisia university fail to graduate. Although enrollment in tertiary
education is growing, many students emigrate to France or other European institutions for
university. This can be linked to the strong informational and technical science programs
in France and the fact that secondary institutions teach these course trajectories in French.

3.4 Democracy
Democracy, as previously stated in this paper, is a new working concept for the
Tunisian government and its citizens. Increased civil liberties and freedoms are, as an
effect of democracy’s implementation, also new to the state. While the establishment of a
democratic regime works to reverse the Ben Ali regime’s oppression, there are areas in
which this fledgling government needs to improve. Without improvement in several
sectors the security of the state will continue to become more fragile and face greater
threats.
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Figure Six. Freedom History plus Future Forecast. Created with International Futures.

Figure Six clearly shows the drop in freedom within Tunisia in the years before the Arab
Spring. A slight drop to just below 4.0 on the index shows that in 2011 freedom was at an
all time low in Tunisia, though it is steadily increasing as democracy has taken hold of
the state. Tunisia does enjoy unprecedented levels of civil liberties and freedom of speech
never seen during the Ben Ali regime, but the question is what cost is incurred when a
previously-authoritarian ruled state gains so many freedoms.
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Figure Seven. Democracy Level, Polity, Scored from -10 to 10. Created with International Futures.

Figure Seven denotes that Tunisia has clearly moved out from the polity rating denoted as
autocratic. It is important to note that Ben Ali’s reign started this trend, as he did
introduce economic and social reform (most notably in the realm of the rights of women),
but the real movement towards a positive polity will be done through democracy. While
the score currently classifies Tunisia as an anocracy and the forecast shows it will stay
this way for a long time, the state’s government clearly is shedding the autocratic
principles it was founded on in favor of introducing higher democratic principles and
ideals.
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3.5 Presentation of the Base Cases and Analysis
Current projections for Tunisia show the state is on track to decrease government
corruption over the next ten years. Figure Eight shows that by 2025 the Government
Corruption (TI) index will move from the current level of 4.35 to 4.54 without any
changes implemented. However, increasing several parameters within reach of the
Tunisian economy and government will further decrease government corruption while
simultaneously moving the state out of a middle income trap. The parameters changed are
the Multifactor Productive growth additive, the Education Tertiary Graduation rate, and
the Economic Freedom multiplier. Each parameter’s influence and changes brought are
analyzed against the current base case to show effects to Tunisia’s development and
overall internal security situation.

Figure Eight. Base Case of Governance Corruption (TI), where a higher index indicates less corruption.
Figure created with the International Futures program.

!
!

31

Current economic freedom levels of the Base Case for Tunisia show that the
variable increases as time progresses, albeit not at high levels. In 2015 the measure of
economic freedom is 6.85, increasing to 6.94 over the next ten years. Tunisia’s level of
economic freedom did not experience a large jump after regime change denoting that
changes flexibility of opportunity did not heavily increase with the transition to
democracy. Increasing economic freedom will not only influence its overall level within
the state but also serve to aid unemployment levels and increase individual income levels.

Figure Nine. Base case of Economic Freedom levels in Tunisia. Figure created with International Futures.

GDP per capita at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) also shows increase for Tunisia’s
current trajectory. The Base Case shows an increase from $10.80 thousand in 2011
dollars to $12.56 thousand in 2011 dollars. This demonstrates that individual purchasing
32
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power in Tunisia will increase almost two thousand dollars over the next ten years:
However this does not account for projected or actual inflation rates and purchasing
power is measured in 2011 USD values. Increases in individual PPP will help Tunisia
move out of the middle income gap, but increases in employment opportunities and
urbanization calls for more specialized jobs across technical industries. Moving out of the
middle income trap is key for increasing the internal security situation.

Figure Ten. Base Case trajectory for GDP per capita at PPP. Figure created using International Futures.

The next sections will show the changes in forecasts across each parameter
changed. While the numbers presented show increases across the board for Tunisia, the
state will remain in the middle income trap unless changes are made through several
injections. Moving out of the middle income trap means the state will become more
productive and influential in the international system because of domestic changes in the
!
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economy. As demonstrated in across the international monetary and security regimes an
economically robust and stable state helps development.

3.6 Forecasts with Parameter Changes
It is important to understand what changes each parameter adds to the scenario
and overall forecast. This section, at the moment, contains the explanations and analysis
of three parameters and the changes associated with each’s implementation into the
scenario. The parameters for this scenario include one additive and two multipliers, each
influencing a number of variables and the overall trajectory of Tunisia’s development.
The first parameter discussed is the Multifactor Productivity Additive (mfpadd).
An additive changes the equation by adding the input value to the equation over a set
period of time with a set input annually. This forecast uses an additive of 0.05 for ten
years, beginning in 2016. The second parameter used is edtergradgr, influencing tertiary
graduation rates annually through a multiplier. Here we use a multiplier rate of 1.5 for ten
years beginning in 2016. The third and final parameter for this study is the economic
freedom multiplier (econfreem). This parameter is set at 1.6 for ten years beginning in
2016. 2016 is chosen as the start for this forecast because it would not make sense to
implement changes in a forecast beginning before a time possible for analysis. The
figures below are presented and analyzed as the base case against the changes in the
created scenario.
Each parameter was chosen because of its ability to influence the state’s internal
security situation. Multifactor productivity will increase the stock of capital within
Tunisia. Increasing capital stock and increase productivity will lend itself to move
!
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Tunisia out of the middle income trap and continue its trajectory of development
associated with increased GDP per capita at PPP. Increasing tertiary graduation rates as a
multiplier was chosen because it helps universities increase the positive effects of a
university education and will help decrease corruption in the long run. Corruption in
education is high and across all levels in Tunisia, but tertiary education is where the state
stands to gain the most. The levels of corruption are discussed in greater detail later.
Finally, the driver of economic freedom was chosen to demonstrate the power that less
corruption will have with the relationship between the state and Tunisian citizens. When
more trust and transparency exist in this relationship we will see a higher level of growth
within the state.

Figure Eleven. GDP per Capita at PPP Base Case versus Parameter Changes. Created with International
Futures.
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First, we look at GDP per Capita PPP changes when each of the parameters run
for ten years at their respective rates. The gains in GDP per Capita at PPP run through the
new scenario denote an almost three thousand 2011 USD increase in 2025 than the Base
Case. Tunisia is already highly educated, and the growth rate from tertiary education
grows during this ten-year period. This is important to note because Tunisia’s population
is already regarded as highly educated and faces the highest unemployment levels, thus
the increase in PPP cannot alone be the reason for the increase. The combination of
multifactor productivity increasing and economic freedom also increasing simultaneously
lend themselves to higher levels of production and increased economic activity. Although
this scenario does not take into account inflation, the measurement in 2011 USD denotes
that the state is on its way to overcoming the middle income trap.

Figure Twelve. Economic Freedom comparison between Base Case and Adjusted Scenario. Created with
International Futures.
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Figure Twelve shows the effect on Economic Freedom with the adjusted
parameters. Under the base case economic Freedom levels hover just below 7.0 for the
foreseeable future, with gains under 0.10 for the ten-year period analyzed. Beginning in
2017 the economic freedom multiplier’s affect has levels at 7.31 until reaching the
pendulum of a ten on the index in 2024. Figure Twelve does not show the Base Case
changing as dramatically as Figure Nine because the Index ranking on the y-axis
accommodates for the increase from the intervention scenario. High economic freedom
growth is necessary for the Tunisian economy. Currently citizens still have fear about
branching out or obtaining licenses for entrepreneurial activities, citing government
corruption as the source. One of the problems the government will face towards
increasing economic freedom is the stigma that police and bureaucracy do not wish to
serve the people unless there is some incentive. Even though the Ben Ali regime no
longer exists, its practices continue to influence aspects of everyday life. This challenge
will be discussed in further detail later, although it is important to note the importance of
economic freedom and the challenges faced with its implementation.
Several indicators of governance exist with the International Futures program.
Several are discussed below, weighing the pros and cons of each and analyzing
effectiveness of the parameters in creating positive change towards Tunisia’s internal
security situation.
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Figure Thirteen. Governance Effectiveness Base Case versus Adjusted Scenario. Created with
International Futures.

Figure Thirteen shows the level of Governance Effectiveness with the Base Case plotted
against the adjusted scenario. Central levels of governance effectiveness include
corruption levels as well as regulatory quality and effectiveness. Though the Base Case
sees Tunisia’s level of effectiveness increasing during the ten-year period measured the
adjusted parameters begin to increase this variable. First moving slowly, the level of
overall Governance Effectiveness takes off in the year 2019 to increase 0.31 above the
Base Case by 2025. Looking at the level of Governance Effectiveness is important
because many analysts look towards Economic Freedom as a measure of it, although the
debate about doing so is considerable. Thus, noting that the long-term rise in this variable
takes off and continues growth during the ten-year period of this study provides a
measure outside of Economic Freedom. Noting that Economic Freedom levels increase
!
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and remain at the highest level four years before the end of this scenario does not mean
the government is operating at an extremely high level of effectiveness.

Figure Fourteen. Governance Corruption, Base Case and Adjusted Scenario. Created with International
Futures.

Figure Fourteen denotes the levels of Government Corruption with both cases.
The effects of these three parameters are evident as the level of corruption decreases
almost 0.22 when compared to the base case in 2025. Corruption levels include several
variable that contribute to its overall level. One of these variables is the GDP per Capita
at PPP, which as previously discussed, increased over three thousand dollars in the
adjusted scenario presented in Figure Ten. Polity, discussed below, also shows increases
over this study. Increasing levels of tertiary education graduation rates and economic
freedom contribute to a less corrupt government. The transparency of Tunisia’s
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government is an important factor to focus on towards internal security. Increasing
transparency of the bureaucracy will lead to high levels of trust from the state’s citizens
towards their government. Higher levels of transparency will contribute to higher levels
of economic freedom and GDP per Capita at PPP. Without a higher level of trust in the
government the internal security situation will remain weak; distrust of the government at
large will grow, citizens will continue to defy institution, and corruption levels may
return to levels noted during the Ben Ali regime.
Polity levels on the negative ten to ten scale do not change significantly with this
scenario. This is because significant changes to the overall democratic structure of the
government do not occur in the alternative scenario. Tunisia rests in the anocracy level of
the polity scale, meaning the risk for insecurity within the government is strong.
However, for a new democracy this should not be a surprise. Over the ten years of this
scenario the polity level is set to increase from -3.45 to -2.48. This does indicate the
democratic levels will increase in the future, decreasing insecurity.

3.7 Major Challenges and Goal Identification
Several challenges present themselves into implementing these development
changes. First there is the issue of increasing tertiary education graduation rates. While
enrollment rates in Tunisian universities continues to boom, recruited students are not
generally qualified for tertiary education and the system that places students in their
fields of study do not coincide with interests.32
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Lapham, Kate, "Cleaning Up Tunisian Education," Open Society Foundations, July 16, 2013, Accessed
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Corruption has evolved into a large part of tertiary education due to the fact that
the focus of enrolling university shifted from learning to obtaining a degree to fulfill
bureaucratic requirements for future employment with the government.33 The mistrust of
the public education system alludes to the overall citizen distrust in the Tunisian
government. Perhaps the biggest challenge facing the reform in education is changing
how students think of university. Without significant changes to push tertiary education
meaning back to learning, students and graduates will continue to learn corrupt practices
and hold little to no significance in earning a degree.
Further, reform needs to be undertaken in how students choose their field of
study. The government-run computer system that works on merit and qualifications does
not adequately meet student choices and interests. Lacking an interest in education
further incentivizes corruption, as students who do not study their interests are more
likely to merely use the degree to fill requirement purposes. Finally, recruiting and
enrolling qualified students will increase graduation rates. This type of reform must begin
in primary and secondary education levels. Teachers notoriously pass students whose
grades do not meet passing marks.34 Pushing students through each grade level does not
increase vitality of the overall population, instead leading to higher levels of corruption,
symbolizing education as merely passing time to receive prerequisites for bureaucratic
jobs.
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Reform in education practices lies center to making this future scenario a reality.
Levels of economic freedom need to be raised. This measure can be taken when the
public no longer distrusts the public sector. Decreasing corruption levels in bureaucracy,
thus increasing transparency, will yield higher levels of trust from the people. Reforming
the corruption practices learned during education will in turn, increase efficiency of the
government by decreasing corruption and allowing for higher levels of economic
freedom.
The goal of this scenario is to increase Tunisia’s internal security situation
through developmental reforms. Corruption plagued, and continues to plague the public
sector. Decreasing corruption through educational reform will lead to higher levels of
economic freedom and higher multifactor productivity. Increased transparency will yield
more trust in the bureaucracy and help push the economic freedom multiplier levels
presented in the scenario. Tunisia’s future rests on the efficiency of its new government
that is backed by its citizens. Current tensions between government efficiency and
transparency and Tunisians means the government has to become more transparent to
earn trust. A stronger government backed by its people will increase security within the
state’s borders.

3.8 Alternative Scenario
The drivers for this study were chosen for specific reasons. The assigned values
for the additive and multipliers hold significance because they indicate attainable and
reasonable aggressive development goals to increase Tunisia’s internal security.
Changing the values of these drivers affect the four variables measured in this study. This
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section will highlight changes in each of these variable when values are changed for each
driver. In this alternative scenario, mfpadd additive decreases from 0.05 to 0.03 over the
ten-year period of the study. Second, edterger multiplier increases from 1.5 to 2.0 for ten
years. Finally, econfree increases from 1.6 to 1.8 for the duration of this study. Each
variable’s change is charted against the base case and then compared in value to the
scenario presented previously.
Modifications made to each driver were made for situations that could occur in
Tunisia over the next ten-year period. The originally mfpadd additive is an aggressive
goal. This is not to say it is not attainable nor feasible, but aggressive. If the multi-factor
productivity increased, but not to the level presented, there could be a decrease in overall
security for Tunisians. Further, this could present a realistic scenario for Tunisia because
it currently lies as a middle-income country and faces the possibility of falling into the
middle-income trap. Further, reform in the ICT sector towards education (discussed later)
highlights mfpadd’s necessity. Tertiary graduation rates were raised because of the
possibility that decreasing corruption will lead to higher graduation rates moving in
tandem with enrollment increases. While graduation levels may increase, this does not
mean that corruption, GDP per Capita at PPP, or governance effectiveness will increase
such that internal security in Tunisia will rise. Economic freedom as a multiplier is
increased because of the vast changes involved in the new democracy’s implementation.
Levels of this variable have already increased greatly, but further increases are possible
due to the ruling party’s moderate religious stance and want to increase economic choice
among the state’s citizens. This alternative scenario’s justification comes from
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possibilities for alternatives that may occur within Tunisia and represent that changes in
the four measured variables. While there may be gains, it should be noted that the
original presented scenario presented the best-case for reforming Tunisia’s internal
security situation.
First, we analyze the variable GDP per Capita at PPP. While it is noticed that the
value increases within the alternative scenario, the value in 2025 Tunisia is 13.84
thousands of USD in 2011, compared to 14.63 thousands of USD in 2011 when the
drivers were in their previous form. Analysis of this variable denotes the importance of
the multi-factor productivity additive’s stance at 0.05 presented in the original scenario.

Figure Fifteen. GDP per Capita at PPP, Base Case versus Alternative Scenario. Created with
International Futures.
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The second variable analyzed is Economic Freedom levels. Not surprising in this case is
that economic freedom levels increase more rapidly when the econfree multiplier is
increased. While full economic freedom (10 on the index) is reached in 2022 with the
alternative scenario, and the overall line graph denotes faster increases overall, both
scenarios present the same end-game. In the originally presented scenario full economic
freedom levels are reached in 2024. Even though the alternative scenario presents a
Tunisia reaching full economic freedom more quickly than the original, both have the
same end result for the state.

Figure Sixteen. Economic Freedom Base Case versus Alternative Scenario. Created with International
Futures.
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Third, the variable of Governance Effectiveness is measured. In 2025 the base case
shows Tunisia’s index level at 2.91. The alternative scenario presented raises the variable
to 2.97. While the original scenario has an index of 3.00, not much higher than the
alternative, the changes in this variable may not reflect the state’s true level of
effectiveness. Pushing more students through university education and awarding a degree
creates a further divide in Tunisian society between those who afford private tutoring or
university professors and administrators who are corrupt and wish to send students into
jobs without teaching. Effectiveness of the bureaucracy is difficult to measure without
testing the level of corruption, although increases in Economic Freedom can contribute to
increases in the effectiveness of governance. However, it should be noted that increases
in multi-factor productivity paired with steady increases in tertiary graduation rates and
economic freedom are best suited to raise Governance Effectiveness.

Figure Seventeen. Governance Effectiveness Base Case versus Alternative Scenario. Created with
International Futures.
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The fourth and final variable measured is Governance Corruption. The Base Case
sees corruption levels decrease to 4.79 by 2025. While the alternative scenario dictates an
increase to 4.69, the originally proposed scenario sees an increase to 4.79. Again, this
variable treats an increase in the index as a lower level of corruption for the state.
Increasing university graduation rates and Economic Freedom while minimally
increasing multi-factor productivity does not produce the most viable and best-case for
Tunisia. While Economic Freedom and university graduation rates (tied to gender

Figure Eighteen. Governance Corruption Base Case versus Alternative Scenario. Created with
International Futures.

empowerment, however Tunisia has and continues to show high levels of female
empowerment across the board) do not decrease corruption as strongly as adding a higher
GDP. Multi-factor productivity’s influence on GDP per Capita at PPP lends itself
Resource Dependence, which is a positive influence on the Governance Corruption
Index.
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This alternative scenario presented shows the effects of slightly changing this
deliverable’s drivers. The results, while positive for Tunisian society, do not benefit the
state as whole towards higher levels of internal security like the main scenario presented.
What can be taken from this alternative scenario, its analysis, and results presented are
actions required to attain the aggressive yet reasonable goals outlined in the main section
of this deliverable. Further, the alternative scenario highlights the importance of each
driver towards the intervention’s success. The numbers chosen for the additive and
multipliers were carefully chosen and reflect a balance between all three that create the
best-case results for improving Tunisia’s internal security.

3.9 Action Required and Key Difficulties
Aggressive goals must be achieved through aggressive actions. First, the action
required to increase tertiary graduation rates is discussed. Corruption exists through the
primary, secondary, and tertiary educations institutions. As previously discussed the use
of private tutors help increase knowledge for students, but this only serves higher
socioeconomic classes who can afford this service. Second, teachers notoriously award
passing grades for students whose results lie below the passing grade of 10. Further,
many students attend university to obtain a degree because it is one of the requirements to
work for the government’s bureaucracy. Additionally, instruction of the ICT branches of
study are conducted exclusively in French at the secondary level, leaving many Tunisian
students to pursue tertiary education in France.
The first, and most important action, is to undertake the fight of corruption among
the state’s educators. Incentivizing professors to care about students and their education
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once existed, but the state’s policy changes in the early 2000’s left many educators
underwhelmed. Increasing pay for educators is the highest complaint received, as well as
increasing opportunities for independent research. When the government supports
innovation and incentivizes reasons to increase education levels among students there
will not only be a decrease in corruption but also an increase in productivity.35 This will
also see a decrease in the use of private tutors and allow for a more equal chance for
learning and development across various levels of socioeconomic classes. Finally,
incentivizing teachers in all levels of education will decrease corruption. This means
students who pass and move on to university will have the capabilities and want to study
their profession. Universities will hold higher retention, and eventually graduation rates
among those enrolled. Second, the Tunisian government should award scholarships for
students to study ICT in France but with the requirement that graduates return to work in
Tunisia within their field. Preventing a brain drain and increasing productivity in the ICT
field will help the state move away from the possible middle-income trap scenario while
also modernizing the country. These education reforms should not face difficulties from
the government to reinvigorate growth and productivity among its citizens: However,
there may be negativity from teachers who do not wish to do more. Many serve as private
tutors for their students, earning extra income through this lucrative profession. Though if
the incentivization program and increase in the ability to conduct independent work
passes through the pushback should not be strong.
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Next we discuss Economic Freedom. The increases in this driver should not face
many difficulties to implement or from society as a whole. The key here is the
government understanding the needs of the people while maintaining a level of control
necessary for order. Implementation of the democratic system is new; establishment of
the permanent democracy is even newer. Ruling party Nidaa Tounis’s moderate stance
has the ability to pass and implement legislation to increase Economic Freedom
throughout the state. Tunisian people enjoy Nidaa Tounis because it stands to contrast the
Islamist parties that ran for office and also have a solid foundation in modeling Tunisian
democracy to fit with the cultural needs of the state. The biggest responsibility is to
increase the relationship between the bureaucracy and Tunisian citizens. Mistrust
between citizens and the bureaucracy stems from the latter’s notorious reputation for
corruption. Decreasing corruption in the education system will lead to a decrease in
corruption within bureaucracy. Students who matriculate into these positions currently
lived through a system where passing grades can be awarded by teachers and a diploma is
nothing more than a requirement for the workforce. Working to decrease corruption in
education will seep into the bureaucracy because the students who no longer grew up
surrounded by its working will begin a new generation of the system. This is not an
overnight fix: Corruption takes years to fix. This can be seen through the scenario’s
analysis. Even though corruption decreased, it was not by significant levels. However,
when the first generation of students who have matriculated through primary, secondary,
and tertiary education enter the workforce we will see the full value of corruption’s
elimination and the strongest relationship between government and people.
!
!

50

Multi-factor productivity, like its namesake, is multi-faceted. The increases seen
through the scenario are dependent on the actions taken through education and economic
reform. As seen through the alternative scenario, all three are tied together and must be
looked upon as a combined engine to increase internal security. The difficulty here lies
with working to increase the educational reforms and decreasing corruption throughout
the government most notably education and the bureaucracy overall. Increasing education
initiatives such as scholarship program for ICT students to study in France for tertirary
education with the promise to return and work in Tunisia will increase mfpadd and move
the state out of the middle income trap possibility. Creating a positive and sustainable
relationship between the Tunisian populous and its government is imperative and
tantamount to the success not only of the security situation but overall success of the
state.

3.10 Conclusions from the Intervention
Based on current trajectory, Tunisia’s projected growth in population will level
out the current youth bulge. However, the current problem faced from today’s youth
bulge is the high levels of unemployment for those aged 19-34. The Tunisian government
must continue its compulsory education throughout primary school and strive for 100%
enrollment, but the real push must come towards students starting and finishing
secondary school. Although more than 65% of those eligible to enroll have, higher levels
of education will allow the government to transform its work force to a skills-based
economy and move out of labor-intensive work. Higher education however, has
presented risks because of high unemployment, leading to mass migration and further
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instability for the security of the country, as the monetary and power of terrorists groups
entices many young adults, which will be explained later. Democracy, though in its
naissance, is proving and projected to have a positive impact on the country. While new
freedoms and civil liberties were rejoiced by citizens, the lack of internal reform focused
on security and implementation of democracy across all forms prevents security within
the state.
In creating an alternative scenario to the Base Case, we need to foster reforms that
help increase the trust and transparency between the government and its citizens. The
most important aspect of this study is decreasing overall government corruption levels.
Noting that corruption levels begin in the early years of education and continue
throughout university where graduates generally use degrees to move into a bureaucratic
position, corruption must be combatted in education. Fostering higher graduation rates
among tertiary students would create higher-caliber graduates, and working to reform
education will fight corruption. More transparency and trust between the government and
its constituents will help increase economic freedom and overall multifactor productivity.
There are major hurdles that must be overcome for this scenario to work, such as fixing
the high corruption in educational programs, but this scenario’s achievement fits the
overarching goal of increasing internal security.
The actions and reforms required to make this intervention work should not
present a high degree of difficulty for the Tunisian government. The public approves of
the ruling Nidaa Tounis party and its stance. The public welcomes democracy and its
procedures, reforms, and implementation. Decreasing corruption significantly takes
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times. This intervention measures the changes over the next ten years, but the full effects
of this intervention will be most seen through the generation to come. Eliminating
corruption and its impact on students who become the workforce will be fully unveiled
when the first class of students who matriculate all the way through tertiary education in
a corruption-free learning environment. Further, the current fears from citizens about
economic freedom should diminish as corruption decreases. When the relationship
between Tunisia’s citizens and its bureaucracy turns positive overall productivity will
increase, thus helping to increase GDP and by effect decreasing overall corruption.
Processes chosen for this intervention and its parameters were carefully selected
to aid Tunisia’s overall internal security situation. The strongest motivation for the
government should be to mend the relationship with its citizens. Stopping the notoriously
corrupt bureaucracy at its roots will help to make this reality. Educational reform to
eliminate corruption on all levels will not only create a working class that embraces a
corruption-free society but will also increase graduation rates from universities by
creating students who enroll for education and not vocational purposes. Tunisia currently
stands in a unique position: The newly-installed democratic regime is poised to move this
country into a new era free from corruption with strong government-citizen bonds. The
proposed intervention seeks to rid the state of the insecurities from the citizens to build a
government that increases productivity, frees the state from the possibility of the middleincome trap, and increase the overall internal security situation within its borders.
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CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION
Tunisia’s security as it currently stands poses a danger to the state. The base of a
country’s continued development lies in a strong sense of internal security. Division
between the ISF and the rest of the country, coupled with the government’s lack of
concrete policy towards reforming the former does not bode well for internal security.
Further, the regional instability and increasing presence of jihadists and terrorists poses
new threats daily. Before Tunisia begins to increase economic development projects,
reform of the ISF needs to begin and command the government and public’s schedule.
Understanding the reform is just as much a public spectacle as a serious government
undertaking will firmly establish Tunisia as a secure regime.
Security, as the public’s top concern, faces striking lacks of transparency and
overlap of responsibilities as well as corruption and human rights violation accusations
across the ISF. Maintaining the ISF’s independence is important, but integrating a code
of conduct and procedures through the ARP with the organic law process outlined in the
constitution will add credibility and accountability to the ISF. Holding public forums to
discuss transparency and specific duties, powers, and the mission of the ISF will decrease
the public’s distrust in the ISF. Further, creating and implementing programs from the
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international community to increase budget transparency instead of blindly arming the
ISF will lend to increase the security of Tunisia.
Only when ISF reforms take hold and provide the base for security can Tunisia
begin to develop internal security solutions. Focusing on attack corruption and
transparency levels through specific intervention scenarios will move Tunisia into a more
secure state, even if the region surrounding it displays further instability. The biggest task
for the Nidaa Tounis government is to ameliorate the relationship between the
government and the populous. Massive mistrust still carries over from the Ben Ali
regime, and the inefficiency and lack of transparency in the bureaucracy continue to
threaten security. Reforms presented work to decrease corruption throughout the
bureaucracy in the long-term, working to eliminate its presence overall. While the people
support the democratic regime there has been no legislation or progress made towards
Tunisia’s internal security.
Again, Tunisia’s stance as the success in the Arab Spring movement faces threats
from increased jihadist and terrorist activity. Political openness, economic development,
and terrorism have strong links and interactions with each other. States with high levels
of political openness have the ability to undertake strong programs of economic
development and face lessened threats of terrorism. Tunisia’s strongest threat comes from
its lack of political openness. Without establishing a base of internal security, jihadist and
terrorist activity and attacks will continue to rise. Further, the relationship between the
government and the public will continue to grow, halting the government’s ability to
effectively serve the people and maintain stability.
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